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CASE STUDY 5: COALITIONS AND CAMPAIGNS
A WORKERS' RIGHTS POLICY CAMPAIGN
Susan D. Carle*
Sarah Leberstein * *
I. BACKGROUND

A lawyer ("L") works on the staff of a national workers' rights
policy organization ("WRPO"). WRPO conducts research and provides
policy analysis, technical and legal assistance, and other campaign
support to advance the rights of low-wage workers. WRPO is governed
by a Board of Directors ("BoD") composed of leaders of workers' rights
organizations, academics, policy people, and labor and employment
lawyers. It is funded largely through foundation grants, supplemented
with some contributions from labor organizations and individuals. It
seeks to work in coalition with membership-based workers'
organizations that request its help. Its BoD makes final decisions on
what campaigns to work on, and it usually defers to the membership
organizations with which it works on matters of campaign strategy.
After consulting with her supervisor-who is WRPO's legal
director and who, in turn receives authorization from the BoD-L
accepts the request of a workers' center ("WC") to join a campaign for
state legislation to create a paid family and medical leave program for
low-income workers in the state. This legislation will both benefit WC's
constituency and advance WRPO's mission goal, which is to advocate at
the national, state, and local levels for strengthened labor standards for
low-wage workers.
WC is a loosely organized metro-based organization. It has a strong
executive director who seems to make most decisions, with some input
from a workers' council, which is composed of volunteer members of
the organization and meets once or twice a year, if at all. Members pay
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small yearly dues and WC receives some foundation funding. WC is
itself affiliated with a national workers' organization ("NWO") made up
of workers' centers from around the country.
WC has recently expanded into a contiguous state that is part of the
metro region in which it is based. Although WC has a very limited
membership in that state, it has launched a legislative campaign for the
new state law on paid medical and family leave described above. L has
previously worked on efforts to pass similar laws in other states and thus
has substantial experience with this kind of legislative campaign.
WC asks several other organizations in the state, including labor
unions and legal services organizations, to join its campaign. It does so
to further their mutual goals and to fulfill certain functions WC cannot
perform on its own, including generating worker turnout to lobby the
state's legislators. WC asks L and two lawyers from other organizations
to provide technical and legal assistance to the campaign, including to:
* analyze the current state of the law;
* give strategic and tactical recommendations to campaign partners;
* draft the legislation;
* draft fact sheets;
* join meetings with the state labor enforcement agency and
lawmakers;
* recruit other campaign partners;
* testify in support of the bill; and
* lobby for the bill's passage.
WC suggests that all the campaign partners should sign a
memorandum of understanding ("MOU") to outline their relationship
with WC and the legislative campaign. Most of these organizations are
put off by what they see as too much formality, however, so they
do not sign such a document. The campaign thus proceeds without a
formal agreement.
II. ISSUES
A. If WC asks L to act as counselfor the campaign, can she do so?
Does it matter what WC has in mind when it asks L to serve as counsel?
The request to serve as "counsel to the campaign" is ambiguous.
L currently is employed by and represents WRPO. Is L being asked, as
WRPO's lawyer, to perform legal work on behalf of WRPO that will be
helpful to the campaign? Is L being asked to represent WC in addition to
WRPO? Or is L being asked to represent a new client comprised of a
"coalition" that is not a legal entity and has no formal decision-making
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structure? All of these are in the realm of possibility, but each has
different ethical implications. A starting point is clarity: what does WC
have in mind; do others in the coalition concur; and is the arrangement
acceptable to WRPO, which, as L's employer and current client, can
veto any proposed arrangement?
The easiest arrangement to analyze is one in which L represents
solely WRPO, and in that capacity performs certain tasks that are helpful
to all of the campaign partners. As long as everyone in the coalition
understands L's role and agrees with it, and WRPO also concurs, L can
serve in this role of assisting in campaign tasks but representing solely
WRPO, subject to the caveat that she may not provide legal advice to
non-clients, as discussed further below.1
In a second scenario, WC could become a joint client of L's along
with WRPO. This scenario, in which L has dual clients, implicates
conflict of interest rules. (Although one or more sets of state rules of
professional conduct would apply to L, this analysis will use the
American Bar Association's ("ABA") Model Rules of Professional
Conduct ("MRPC").) Under Rule 1.7,2 L would first have to ask herself
whether she faced a conflict of interest. At the outset of the legislative
campaign at issue in this case study, all potential clients have similar
interests in the legislation's passage. However, as the unfolding facts in
this case study will soon show, a conflict of interest could easily arise if
WRPO and WC decide to take different paths in the course of the
campaign. At a minimum, therefore, L should obtain informed
consent from both WRPO and WC before agreeing to take on such a
joint representation.
Many problems could arise that should be discussed. For example,
if L has conversations with her supervisor at WRPO about misgivings
she holds about the direction the campaign is taking, must L share those
conversations with WC as a co-client? WC should understand
such possibilities before deciding whether it wants L to serve as its
legal counsel.
Whether L should accept WC as a client depends not only on L's
analysis of conflicts problems, but also whether L thinks this is the best
way to proceed as a matter of prudence and strategy. L may well
question whether accepting WC as a client would be the best way to
proceed as a matter of prudence. L does not seem to know WC very
well, and WC seems to lack a governance structure that ensures strong
accountability to its constituents. At the same time, L can do much to
1. See infra Part f.A, D.
2. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 1.7 (AM. BAR ASS'N 2018).
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advance the campaign WC is spearheading without taking on WC as a
client. Indeed, based on the facts presented, there does not seem to be
much of a reason why L should take on WC as a client. L can work for
the legislative proposal in question without representing WC, as already
discussed, and working on the campaign with WRPO as her sole client
avoids the conflicts problems that would arise if she were to take on WC
3
and WRPO as dual clients.
If L were to decide to take on WC as a second client, she first
would have to obtain informed consent from both WC and WRPO, after
explaining to both clients the consequences of conflicts between the two
organizations arising in the course of the representation. Such informed
consent should also spell out what L anticipates doing if a nonconsentable conflict were to arise during the course of the
representation. For example, would L anticipate withdrawing from
representing WC but continuing to represent WRPO (if possible)?
The trickiest option for L would be to agree to represent the
campaign coalition as a client. This is particularly true because the
members of the coalition appear unwilling to give this loose grouping
any formal structure. If L were to agree to take on the coalition as a
client, L should insist on developing a clear process for coalition
decision-making. The process need not be elaborate but should be
articulated in writing for everyone's future reference. Without such an
agreement among the members of the coalition as to how decisions are
to be made, L would lack a means for receiving instructions from her
client as to how to proceed in the representation. 4 Thus, L should explore
whether the members of the coalition are willing to agree on a decisionmaking process. If they are not, L probably should not accept the
coalition itself as a client.
There might be some advantages to representing the coalition itself,
in that L could formulate legal advice and serve as the legal
representative of the entire group. This could in turn lead to economies
of scale and greater efficiency and cost savings. However, without a
decision-making process that would allow L to receive clear instructions
3. Another available alternative would be for L to represent WC but not WRPO as her sole
client in this matter. Given that L is an employee of WRPO and receives her livelihood from this
organization, she could find herself in a difficult position if a conflict arose between WC and
WRPO's interests. We therefore do not recommend this option in this fact scenario, though there
may be other situations in which it would be fine for a movement lawyer to represent a client in a
matter but not also the organization that employs her. Indeed, this frequently happens in litigation in
which the organization that employs a lawyer is not a party in the case.
4. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 1.13(a) cmt. 1 (noting that a lawyer who

represents an organization represents the entity itself, as acting through the persons "duly
authorized" to act and make decisions on its behalf).
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from her client, L could quickly find herself facing conflicting demands
from various members of the coalition. Thus, L should not agree to
represent the coalition as a whole if the coalition lacks a means for
giving her instructions through "duly authorized" representatives of the
entity pursuant to Rule 1.13(a).'
But even if L does not accept the coalition as a client, there are
other ways she can help out the campaign, as already noted above and
discussed further below. 6 L can represent WRPO only and participate in
the campaign as WRPO's representative, performing tasks for the entire
coalition with everyone's consent.
As previously noted, L may not engage in activities that constitute
the practice of law on behalf of persons or entities that are not clients.
Thus, another important matter to flag is the question of which of the
activities in which L expects to be engaged during the legislative
campaign involve the practice of law. The rules of professional conduct
generally apply only insofar as a lawyer is engaged in the practice of
law;7 in activities lawyers engage in that do not involve8 the practice of
law, only the misconduct prohibitions of Rule 8.4 apply.
To be sure, some activities performed by non-lawyers become
practice of law when lawyers engage in them. An example is negotiating
sports contracts, which both lawyers and non-lawyer sports agents do,
but which clearly constitutes the practice of law when lawyers perform
in this role. This is because lawyers who are negotiating contracts apply
law to facts and give legal advice. But not all activities a lawyer does
constitute practice of law just because a lawyer performs them. For
example, a lawyer that organizes a campaign rally is not practicing law.
The line between what does and does not constitute practice of law
can be a difficult one to draw. However, in the movement lawyering
context it is sometimes important to draw this line in order to avoid
over-restricting lawyers' freedom to engage in political activity. In
addition, too cramped a reading of the MRPC restricts the resources
available to social movements, which in turn leads movement activists to
disregard the rules rather than working within them. Thus, it is worth
taking time to carefully think through what activities a movement lawyer
performs constitute practice of law, and thus should be performed only
on behalf of clients, and what activities do not constitute the practice of
law, and thus can be performed on behalf of broad constituencies with
whom the lawyer has not formed a client-lawyer relationship.
5. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 1.13(a).
6. See infra Part H.E.
7. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY preamble & scope.
8.

MODEL RULES OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY r. 84.
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The rules regarding what constitutes practice of law are designed to
protect clients. Thus one guideline we would propose is that, to the
extent that lawyers are performing activities that do not cause nonclients to rely on them for legal advice, there is no reason lawyers should
not be able to perform those activities for movement constituencies
without taking them on as clients. To the extent that some activities that
L expects to perform for the campaign do not involve the practice of law
and do not lead non-clients to rely on her for legal advice, L can perform
them on behalf of all of the coalition partners.
What constitutes practice of law is a complicated question, and
what constitutes practice of law in the context of movement lawyering is
potentially even more complex. Different states have widely varying
laws on the topic,9 and the ABA Rules of Professional Conduct do not
address this question. In 2002, an ABA Task Force on the Model
Definition of Law proposed a definition, which stated that, "[t]he
practice of law is the application of legal principles and judgment with
regard to the circumstances or objectives of a person that require the
knowledge and skill of a person trained in the law."1 It withdrew its
proposal in 2003, following objections from the Federal Trade
Commission ("FTC"), the U.S. Department of Justice ("DOJ"), and
other groups that argued that this definition was too broad and
anticompetitive." Instead, the ABA Task Force urged states to continue
to adopt their own definitions. l
Even under the ABA Task Force's arguably over-broad proposal,
two exclusions this proposal implicitly encompassed are of relevance
here. First, the definition excludes activities that non-lawyers routinely
perform; and, second, it requires assessing the circumstances of a
specific "'person" (which can, of course, be a specific entity) rather than
a broad constituency or interest group. 3

9. See, e.g., Task Force on the Model Definition of the Practice of Law: Appendix A: State
Definitions of the Practiceof Law, AM. BAR ASS'N (2016), https://www.americanbar.org/content/
dam/aba/administrative/professional responsibility/model-def migrated/model def statutes.auth
checkdam.pdf [hereinafter Appendix A] (compiling state laws).
10. See Task Force on the Model Definition of the Practice of Law Draft, AM. BAR ASS'N
(Sept. 18, 2002), https://www.americanbar.org/groups/professional-responsibility/task_forcemodel definitionpractice law/model definition definition.html (last updated Oct. 5, 2011)
[hereinafter Task Force].
11. See U.S. Fed. Trade Comm'n & Dep't Justice, Comments on the American Bar
Association's Proposed Model Definition of the Practice of Law (Dec. 20, 2002),
https://www.justice.gov/atr/comments-american-bar-associations-proposed-model-definitionpractice-law.
12. Id.
13. See generally Task Force,supra note 10.

https://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol47/iss1/9

6

Carle and Leberstein: Case Study 5: Coalitions and Campaigns a Workers' Rights Policy C

2018]

CASE STUDY 5: COALITIONS AND CAMPAIGNS

As applied to this case study, the first exclusion just mentioned
arguably eliminates from the scope of what constitutes practice of law a
number of activities that non-lawyers also frequently do
competently and in which L anticipates being involved. These include,
in the list above:
* giving strategic and tactical recommendations to campaign partners;
* drafting fact sheets;
* joining meetings with the state labor enforcement agency and
lawmakers;
* recruiting other campaign partners;
* testifying in support of the bill (where legal analysis is not involved);
and
* lobbying for the bill's passage.
When a movement lawyer engages in these activities, she arguably
participates in these activities as a movement activist rather than as a
lawyer representing a client. To be sure, the lawyer may bring her legal
training and knowledge to her performance of these activities, but nonlawyers traditionally perform these activities with a high degree of
competence as well.
As to the second exclusion above-namely, solving the legal
problems of specific persons or entities-performance of some of the
activities listed above does not constitute the practice of law because L
would not be applying her legal expertise to solve the problems of a
specific person or entity. Some states include this factor in their
definitions of practice of law, and it helps distinguish lawyers' work on
policy matters from that of solving client-specific problems. 4
When L is performing tasks on behalf of the coalition, L should be
clear on what role she is playing in situations in which coalition
members could become confused about her role. For example, if a
coalition partner asks L to state her legal views on matters that arise in
the course of the campaign, L should clarify that she is offering her legal
views solely as the legal representative of whomever she has agreed to
represent as her client(s). In contrast, when she is giving her opinions on

14. See, e.g., RULES OF THE S.C. AZ., REGULATION OF THE PRACTICE OF LAW r.
31(a)(2)(A)(1), (2) & (5) (West 2018) (defining the practice of law as, inter alia, preparing legal
documents, opinions or negotiating legal rights for "a specific person or entity"); RULEs
GOVERNING THE WYOMING STATE BAR & THE AUTHORIZED PRACTICE OF LAW, r. 7(c) (defining
the practice of law as, "providing any legal service for any other person, firm or corporation, with or
without compensation, or providing professional legal advice or services where there is a client
relationship of trust or reliance, including appearing as an advocate in a representative capacity;
draffing pleadings or other documents; or performing any act in a representative capacity in
connection with a prospective or pending proceeding before any tribunal.").
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matters of general policy or strategy, L should clarify that she is not
offering these as legal opinions or advice; instead, she is participating in
these discussions as a fellow movement activist.
While some activities L will perform in working on the campaign
likely do not involve the practice of law, others do. L is practicing law
when she applies law to facts to render legal advice to a specific person
or entity, such as when she is "analyzing the current state of the law," as
described in the likely tasks listed above. When L does this, she should
state that she is offering her legal analysis on behalf of WRPO if that is
her sole client in the matter.
Finally, it is ambiguous whether some activities L anticipates
involve the practice of law. In this category falls:
* Drafting the legislation.
In drafting legislation, L is engaging in an activity that non-lawyers
often perform competently. Moreover, in this scenario she is not
applying her legal expertise to solve the problems of a specific person or
entity-although in other situations lawyers may be doing so and then
would be practicing law. L can avoid any ambiguity on this score by
stating that, to the extent her contributions involve applying law to
specific facts, she is engaged in legislative drafting as the legal
representative of her client(s).
* Giving advice to the campaign partners as to whether various
proposals will effectively carry outpolicy objectives.
Here again, L's role does not involve applying law to facts to give
legal advice to a specific person. It instead involves policy analysis,
which non-lawyers frequently do competently and which does not
involve performing legal analysis about any specific person or entity.
Thus, in context L's role in providing policy advice does not appear to
involve practicing law, though the specifics of the policy advice would
have to be explored in order to reach a definitive conclusion about
whether L was giving legal advice along with policy recommendations.
Again, it would be a good idea to explain this to all campaign partners
and to remind them that to the extent legal analysis is involved in L's
policy analysis, that advice is directed to the interests of WRPO.
B. Does the lawyer's greaterloyalty to WRPO preclude her
from representingthe campaign coalition?If she represents
the coalition,can she also act on behalfof WRPO individually?
No, L's greater loyalty to WRPO does not necessarily preclude her
from representing the campaign coalition, provided all of the conditions
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discussed in answer (A) above are met. 15 As already explained there, this
approach is probably not a good idea, especially given that other
alternatives are available.
In deciding whether representing the coalition is possible, L must
first determine whether she has an actual or potential conflict on her
hands. Here it appears that L already faces an actual conflict at the start
of the campaign, given that her greatest loyalty is to her primary client
and employer, WRPO. Thus, at the outset L must determine if she
reasonably believes that she can provide effective representation to both
clients, as per Rule 1.7(b)(1). 16 She must also obtain informed consent
the risks of joint representation, as
from both clients after explaining
17
1.7(b)(4).
Rule
under
required
In short, L could represent the coalition and act on behalf of WRPO
individually, but only insofar as she obtained informed consent from
both clients and assured herself that she would not be harming the
interests of either the coalition or WRPO in this representation. If she
found herself unable to do so, she would have to withdraw from
representing at least one of these clients because L would find herself in
a position in which her representation of one client materially limited her
ability to represent another, in which situation, she could no longer
represent both clients. In other words, the conditions for continuing to
represent both clients would not be present, as explained in Rule
1.7(a)(2).18 This question thus helps illustrate why it probably would not
be a good idea to take on both the coalition and WRPO as clients in this
particular fact scenario.
C. What would have to be the groundrulesfor representing
more than one client in this situation?
As already noted above, Rule 1.7(a)(2) provides that, in taking on a
client, the lawyer must ensure that her representation of that client is not
materially limited by her representation of another client or any other
consideration. 9 She must also obtain the informed consent of all of the
relevant clients, under Rule 1.7(b)(4). This includes explaining to them
the risks of joint representation and the likely process the lawyer would
undertake if required to withdraw from one or more representations if a
2
non-consentable conflict were to arise during the representation. "
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.

See supra Part fA.
MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 1.7(b)(1) (AM. BAR ASS'N 2018).
Id. r. 1.7(b)(4).
Id. r. 1.7(a)(2).
Id; see supra Part l.B.
See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 1.7(b)(4).
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Finally, as already discussed above, she would have to ensure that any
organizational client(s) she agreed to represent had a clear decisionmaking structure that would allow her to receive instruction through
duly authorized agents.
Now assume that L decides, in light of all of the considerations
discussed above, that she will become involved in the legislative
campaign as the lawyer representing WRPO. Thus, in meetings with
lawmakers and agency staff, testimony, and in writing op-eds and the
like, L identifies herself as a lawyer representing WRPO. She does not
say that she is the coalition's or WC's lawyer. In several instances,
however, no one from WC ends up beingpresent during conversationsL
has with lawmakers or other decision-makers. These figures askfor L 's
opinion on proposedrevisions to the bill.
D. Does L have an implicit lawyer-client relationshipwith WC,
or has she led WC to rely on her as counsel?
To answer this question, some additional facts would be helpful. In
these communications, is L expressing her personal opinion, her client's
opinion, or the coalition's opinion? Assume that L is acting as the
representative of WRPO. As long as she states this, L can also say that
WRPO is a member of the coalition and that she is acting on behalf of
the coalition, provided that is the case. As a good coalition member,
WRPO will want to promote the coalition's views and maintain a good
relationship with WC, an important coalition member. If there is a
crucial difference of opinion, WRPO, through L, should seek to thrash it
out with WC.
Indeed, WRPO can authorize L to act in the best interests of the
coalition as a whole. After clarifying that she is representing WRPO, L
can, under instructions from WRPO, act in ways that benefit the entire
coalition. In doing so, she is simply following her client's instructions.
For example, WRPO can listen to the input of campaign members and
then say, "I am not giving you advice or working for you as a client but
only for WRPO. However, as a good coalition member, WRPO wants to
develop and promote proposed legislation that satisfies the goals of the
entire coalition and keeps the coalition together. After listening to
everyone's input, here is what I propose on behalf of WRPO and
why.... " This may involve the practice of law, but L is clear that she is
acting for WRPO only, under the instructions she has received from her
client to strive to take account of everyone's interests, at least for
the time being. This is different from giving legal advice to
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non-clients, because these non-clients clearly understand that L is solely
WRPO's lawyer.
At the same time, for all of the reasons discussed above, L should
take care to avoid the creation of an implicit client-lawyer relationship
with WC. 21 L should be careful to ensure that WC does not view her as
its counsel. To do so, L should explain to WC that she does not intend to
enter into a client-lawyer relationship with WC. She should do so in
writing to memorialize this understanding. Such a writing may not be
enough to disclaim the existence of a client-lawyer relationship,
however. If L finds that WC appears to be relying on her for legal
advice, L should explain that she is solely representing WRPO and
suggest that WC obtain its own independent legal advice. 2
E. If L does not act as counsel to the campaign coalition,must she
clarify to lawmakers that she speaks only in the capacity of a
representativeof WRPO and not on behalfof WC or the campaign?
L is not required by the MIRPC to state affirmatively that she speaks
only in the capacity of a legal representative of WRPO, but if she sees
that others misunderstand her role, she is required to correct such a
misunderstanding.2 3 For this reason, the best practice for L would be to
introduce herself as the representative of WRPO at the outset of any
meeting. If the coalition has authorized her to speak on its behalf, she
can say so. For example, she can say (if accurate) that she is the lawyer
for WRPO, and the campaign coalition has authorized WRPO to speak
for the coalition in a particular meeting.
Note as well that some of what L might be doing in such meetings
with lawmakers may not cross into the realm of practicing law, in which
case L would be bound by legal ethics rules only with respect to the
dictates of Rule 8.4 (which provide in essence that lawyers may not lie,
cheat, or steal even when engaged in activities that do not involve the
practice of law).24 Nevertheless, there is no reason not to clarify that, to
the extent that she is practicing law, L is acting solely as a legal
representative of WRPO. Thus, it would be best practice for L
consistently to identify herself as the legal representative of WRPO
rather than allowing the potential for confusion to arise.

21.

See supra Part n.D.

22.

MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 4.3 (AM. BAR ASS'N 2018).

23.
24.

See id.
Id.r. 8.4.
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F. May L provide her own analysis to lawmakers if WC is notpresent?
Must she consult with all coalitionpartners before having such
meetings?
In terms of the rules of legal ethics, L can provide a legal analysis
to lawmakers on WRPO's behalf, as the lawyer for WRPO alone and
without WC present, provided that she does not mislead lawmakers as to
whom she is representing. Whether she must consult with all coalition
partners before such meetings does not depend on the rules of legal
ethics but on the agreements the campaign members have with each
other as to how they will work together as a coalition.
Now assume that tensions arise among the coalition members
during the course of the campaign when lawmakers reintroduce a
significantly weakened version of the bill. WC wants to proceed with the
campaign in the hopes of scoring what may be largely a symbolic
victory. WC feels this could create momentum for future efforts.
However, WRPO and other campaign partners believe continuing with
the campaign at this point could undermine future efforts with greater
potential to enact meaningful reforms. WC's national affiliate, NWO,
agrees with WRPO, but NWO has no power over WC's actions.
G. Does L have to stop her involvement in the campaign when this
conflict arises among the campaignpartners?
Whether L would have to stop her involvement in the campaign
depends on whom L represents. Indeed, this scenario illustrates the
reason it is so important to obtain clarification at the outset of any
representation as to who a lawyer's client(s) is (or are). L has no
conflicts problem here if WRPO is L's only client and L has avoided
creating a de facto client-attorney relationship with any other campaign
partners during the 6ampaign. A court would answer this question by
looking to the reasonable expectations of the non-lawyer clients.
Whether L should continue to participate in the campaign in the situation
described above would depend on what WRPO, speaking through its
decision-maker, the BoD, directs her to do. This will largely involve
strategic judgments that L may assist WRPO in making. In short, L
represents WRPO and should continue to represent WRPO's interests as
WRPO defines them.
If L represents two or more clients in the campaign, however, and a
non-consentable conflict arises among those clients, then L will have to
withdraw from representing one or more of these clients. The clients
may have agreed to waive conflicts of interests at the outset, but note
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that such advance waivers do not apply to non-consentable conflicts,
which can take many forms. (One classic example involves a lawyer
holding material confidential information about Client One that is
important for Client Two to know, but which Client One refuses to
authorize the lawyer to disclose to Client Two.)
In the instant case study, it appears that such a non-consentable
conflict has arisen. L cannot both continue to advocate for the
legislation, as WC wants to do, and at the same time stop doing so, as
WRPO and the other campaign partners want to do. This is especially
true if L represents the coalition and the coalition has no process for
making decisions when it encounters disagreements among members.
The situation described above illustrates the reason it would probably be
unwise for L to agree to represent the coalition if its members do not
want to adopt a decision-making process that would allow them to give
instructions to L in cases of internal disagreement among the campaign
coalition members.
The most likely kind of conflict that would cause L to have to
withdraw from some but not all clients in a multiple representation
situation is one in which L reasonably feels that she cannot provide
effective representation to all clients. That seems to be the type of
conflict that would be at issue here if L had taken on the representation
of both WRPO and WC. The divergent strategies the two organizations
want to pursue cannot be taken simultaneously; the coalition can either
proceed with a watered down bill or it can decide not to proceed with
this bill, but it cannot do both.
In this situation, L should withdraw from representing one or more
clients as necessary to eliminate the conflict (following the process she
formerly spelled out to the clients at the outset of the representation) as
discussed above.2 5 This question illustrates the importance of spelling
out at the outset of any joint client representation a sensible process for
withdrawing from representation if necessary, so that a procedure
for handling this possibility is in place before a non-consentable
conflict arises.
III. CONCLUSION

In sum, this case study reflects some of the potential ethics
questions that can arise as a result of a "messy" coalition, in which one
organization starts a legislative campaign and later invites other allies or
potential allies to join it. It further illustrates that one should not assume

25. See supra Part I1G.
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that local grassroots organizations are more accountable to constituents
than national organizations; sometimes that is true but in other situations
it may not be. What appears key, as reflected in this case study, is the
importance of urging movement organizations to develop reasonable
systems for decision-making and accountability, so that lawyers can rely
on decision-making processes within client organizations for instructions
and guidance as they represent these clients.
Finally, this case study raises difficult questions about which of the
many types of creative work movement lawyers do constitute "the
practice of law" for purposes of legal ethics analysis. Further analysis of
those difficult questions is important so that legal ethics rules continue to
provide appropriate safeguards to clients but are not applied in an
overbroad manner. Overbroad application of legal ethics rules risks
constraining the potential creativity of movement lawyers as they strive
for new and more effective ways of proceeding in partnership with other
movement actors to achieve movement goals.26

26. See generally Susan D. Carle & Scott L. Cummings, A Reflection on the Ethics of
Movement Lawyering, 31 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHics 441 (2018) (discussing specific legal ethics
challenges that arise in movement lawyering and arguing that standard ethics principles require
revision in order to better facilitate the important work that movement lawyers do).
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